# Cross-country Income Gaps: Institutions

Prof. Lutz Hendricks

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### Objectives

The world's richest countries produce 20 times more output per worker than the poorest.

Why?

Most economists believe that **institutions** are the main cause of cross-country income differences.

In this section you learn:

- 1. what institutions are
- 2. which evidence supports the importance of institutions (an example of IV)
- 3. about the origins of institutional differences

#### Fact

More than half of the world population earns less than 10% of U.S. income per worker.



Source: Jones (2013)

#### Fact

Income gaps persist over long time periods.



GDP per person (US = 1) in 2011

Source: Jones (2016)

#### Fact

#### Rich and poor countries are geographically concentrated.



What does this suggest about the origins of income differences? See Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) for more.

Institutions: What are they?

#### What are Institutions

Vaguely:

"Humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction." (North 1990)

## Examples

Protection of property rights.

 Russia: Businesses are routinely "purchased" by politically connected actors.

Rule of law.

- Peru: It takes 290 days to start a small business (paying 2 bribes; De Soto).
- USA: 6 days; India: 29 days (World Bank "Doing Business").

Freedom of speech.

► Galileo. Navalny.

... and many more (the key problem)

# How Do Institutions Affect Output?

Reduced return on investment:

- bribery
- expropriation

Misallocation of resources:

favorable treatment for politically connected firms

Less competition

- government monopolies
- ... and many more channels (the key problem).

There are many institutions that may matter.

There are many channels through which institutions may matter. Therefore:

It is easy to show the obvious: institutions are important.

It is hard to figure out which institutions are important.

# Evidence: Institutions Matter

# Great Divergence



Fig. 21 The great divergence. *Note*: The graph shows GDP per person for various countries. The units Source: Jones (2016)

Rich countries took off after the Industrial Revolution

Implications:

Whatever causes cross-country income gaps

- took hold around the time of the Industrial Revolution
- has affected countries persistently over centuries
- has caused countries to delay industrialization

What force is this persistent? - Institutions.

# Geography



Another highly persistent force: geography.

What do rich countries have in common?

### How to measure institutions?

The problems:

- There are many institutions
- Institutions are hard to measure (unlike, say, tax rates)
- Rich countries have lots of good institutions (correlation)

### Rich Countries Have Good Institutions



IMF (2003)

In rich countries, usually **all** institutions are high quality. Which measure to use?

One answer: use an index

- an average of several measures
- e.g. Social Infrastructure by Hall and Jones (1999)

The downside: not clear which institutions matter.

### How About Causality?

We know that correlations do not imply causation.

Why not?

How can we establish that institutions cause income? A general problem in economics.

Common approaches:

- 1. Build a model (not yet feasible for institutions).
- 2. Natural experiments.

## Natural Experiments

Why is it hard to establish cause-effect?

because "other" variables may vary with institutions

The science approach: controlled experiments

- vary one variable at a time
- hold all others constant
- example: medical trials with control groups
- rarely feasible in (macro) economics

Natural experiments approximate controlled experiments.

- Look for historical cases where a "random event" changes a variable.
- Examples:
  - a war or natural disaster destroys capital what happens to output?
  - countries are divided and adopt different institutions

## Divided countries

Cases:

- East & West Germany
- South & North Korea
- Hong Kong and Taiwan vs. China

In all cases, the democratic / market oriented countries did better than the communist ones.

## Divided Countries: Korea



Figure 3. GDP per capita in North and South Korea, 1950–98.

Source: Acemoglu et al. (2005)

## **Divided** Countries

Limitations:

- very few cases
- crude: only shows the "obvious point" that autocracies don't do well
- does not answer the key question: which institutions should poor countries improve?

### Colonies

Since there are few divided countries, we need another source of evidence.

Colonies can be used to shed light on:

- where do bad institutions come from?
- how much do they matter for output?

A remarkable fact: colonial effects persist for hundreds of years.

## Colonies: The Story

A large part of the world was colonized by Europeans after 1500. In some colonies, democratic institutions were put in place

North America, Australia, New Zealand

In other colonies, dictatorial / expropriating institutions were put in  $\ensuremath{\mathsf{place}}$ 

#### Africa

Today's institutions are strongly related to those imposed on the colonies hundreds of years ago.

Can we simply compare GDP between colonies with good versus bad institutions and be done?

To get clean evidence, we need to look for "accidental" factors that shaped the institutions of colonies.

- then we have a natural experiment
- some colonies "accidentally" have bad institutions while others have good institutions
- we can estimate the effect of institutions on output by comparing the two groups

## Where Did Colonizers Choose Bad Institutions?

Colonies come in two types:

- 1. Poor: Few resources and few people.
- 2. Rich: Endowed with resources that can be extracted (including labor).

In poor colonies, the only way to exploit the land is to settle.

- Settlers bring institutions which protect their own rights.
- Or settlers establish rights with force (USA).

In rich colonies, the most profitable strategy is to **expropriate** locals.

- Institutions protect the colonial minority's rights / deny rights to the local majority.
- Forced labor (South America, Africa).

### Implications

This theory predicts a **reversal of fortunes**.

Among colonies: those who were initially rich should now have

- bad institutions
- Iow income

The same should not be the case among countries that were not colonized.

This idea is due to Acemoglu et al. (2002)

### Evidence: Rich Colonies - Bad Institutions



Figure 13. Log population density in 1500 and average protection against risk of expropriation 1985-95.

Source: Acemoglu et al. (2005) Population density is a proxy for per capita income.

## Reversal of Fortune

#### Colonies that were rich in 1500 are poor today.



GDP per person (US = 1) in 2011

Source: Jones (2016)

# No reversal among Non-Colonies



Figure 9. Urbanization in 1500 and log GDP per capita in 1995, among non-colonies.

### Acemoglu et al. (2005) Clearly inconsistent with geography as cause of development.

# Quantifying the Role of Institutions

#### The idea:

- Use variation in institutions across colonies that is "accidental."
- Measure the income differences between colonies with accidentally good and accidentally bad institutions.
- These income differences are **caused** by institutions.
- Details in Acemoglu and Robinson (2001)
  - The accidental factor is settler mortality
  - Countries with lots of malaria etc could not be settled, so they were exploited

**Result**: Institutions account for the majority of cross-country income gaps.

# Summary

- Ample evidence that institutions are important for Y/L.
  - Colonies provide a natural experiment that "randomly" assigns institutions to countries.
  - Divided countries "prove" that communist institutions reduce incomes.
- Key open questions:
  - 1. Which institutions are important?
  - 2. How much do institutions contribute to Y/L gaps?

### **Review Questions**

- 1. Why is the "reversal of fortunes" evidence so compelling?
- 2. What could go wrong with the colonial evidence?
  - 2.1 Could you tell a reverse causality story?
  - 2.2 Could you tell an omitted variable story?
- 3. Why is it so hard to figure out which institutions are important?

# Reading

Jones (2013), ch. 7.

 Jones / Vollrath, Introduction to Economic Growth, 4th ed., ch. 8

#### Advanced Reading:

- Romer (2011), ch. 3.10.
- Acemoglu et al. (2005) lays out the evidence in favor of institutions as fundamental causes of development.
- Hall and Jones (1999) attempt to quantify the role of institutions using instrumental variables.

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